SOME ECONOMIC ASPECTS OF IMMIGRATION
INTO THE UNITED STATES
JOSEPH J. SPENGLER*

Pleasure or businesse, so, our Soules admit
For their first mover, and are whirld by it.
Hence is't, that I am carryed towards the West.
John Donne
This paper has to do with the economic aspects of American immigrationamong them, the capacity of the American economy to absorb immigrants and the
probable response of the American economy to variations in the volume of immigration. Accordingly, both a historical and an analytical approach are employed. Part
I is given to an historical r&ume of the economic dimensions of American immigration. A summary account of the actual effects of immigration upon the American
economy is presented in part II. Parts III and IV are devoted to an outline of the

implications of economic-demographic theory for the subject under consideration.
In part V, conclusions for policy based upon the preceding historical and analytical
sections are indicated.

I
HIsToRCAL BACKGROUND

The movement of population from Europe to the lands across the sea during
the past century and a half is divisible into two parts; a redistribution of population within the Atlantic economy, and a passage of people from Europe to countries
situated outside the Atlantic economy.

Redistribution of population within the

Atlantic economy accounted for the major part of this transoceanic movement, and
emigration to the United States dominated this redistributive process. Between
i8oo and 195 o, about 67 million emigrants crossed the ocean, of whom "approximately 6o million were Europeans, and, of these, some 40 million came to the United
States."'2 While many of these migrants returned to Europe, somewhat in excess of
*A.B. 1926, M.A. 1929, Ph.D. 1930, Ohio State University. James B. Duke Professor of Economics, and Director of Graduate Studies in Economics, Duke University. Consultant on Population to
United Nations, X950-5i. Author, FRANCE FACES DEPOPULATION (1938); FRENCH PREnEcESSORS o
M[fALTs (1942). Contributor to scholarly periodicals on demographic and economic subjects.
'See BRINLEY THoMAs, MIGRATION AND ECONoMIC GROWTH CC. 1, 14 (1954).
' W. S. AND E. S. WorrsNSKY, WORLD POPULATION AND PRODuCTION 72 (1953). Some 45 million
persons emigrated from Europe to North America between 16oo and 195o, of whom some 25 million
remained; approximately 20 million, of whom close to i8 million remained, went to Middle and
South America; over 5 million went to Oceania and Africa. Negro slaves imported into the Americas
numbered nearly 15 million. See id. at 69, 72. Asiatic migration has been much less intercontinental
than has European. Only about 3 million emigrants left Asia in i8oo-i95o. Of the 30 million emigrants who left India and Pakistan in 1834-1937, about 24 million returned, while of the approximately
5 million persons of Indian descent living outside India around 194o, about four-fifths resided in Burma,
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70 per cent remained, with the ratio of net to gross immigration declining from
close to ioo per cent in the i82o's to around 65 per cent in I9oo-30
TABLE I
IMMIGRATION AND POPULATION GRowTH, THE UNITED STATEs,

1850-i950

(IN MILLIONS)

FOREIGN-BoRN WmTE

POPULAION
Increase in Preceding Decade

Gross
Immigration
in Preceding
Decade

Net
Immigration
in Preceding
Decade

2.2
4.1

1.9

1.7
2.6

1.42
2.56

39.8

5.5

1.4

2.3

2.07

50.2
62.9

6.6
9.1

1.1
2.5

2.8
5.2

2.58
4.96

76.0

Population
(reported
by Census)

Total

1850 ..........
1860 ..........

23.2
31.4

1870 ...........
880 ...........
1890 ...........

Census
Year

1900 ...........

10.2

1.1

3.7

3.69

1920 ...........

92.0

13.3

105.7

3.1

13.7

0.4

8.8

6.24

5.7

2.23

1930 ...........
1940 ...........

122.8
131.7

14.0
11.4

0.3
-2.6

4.1
0.5

3.34
.07*

1910 ...........

1950 ...........

150.7

10.2

-1.2

1.0

.88*

SoURCEs: Cob. 2-5, U. S. DEP'T oF ComHEncE, STATISTICAL
ABSTRCr OFTHEUNITEDSTATES
(1954) thereinafter cited as STATISTICA
ABsTnAcr], and HisroRtee, STATISTICS
or TIM UITRED STATES,1789-1945 (1949) [hereinafter cited as HISTORICAL
STATISTICS];
Col. 6,
W. S. Tuoupsos
AwnsP. K. WuELPToN, POPt.LATION
TRENzS IN THE UNITED STATES303 (1933).
*Based on STATISTICAL
AnsrACr, su~ra.

Figures presented in Table I suggest the order of magnitude of post-i85o immigration into the United States, by decade, and the ostensible4 contribution of immigration to population growth. In the period i8oo-4o, about 8oooo immigrants
came to the United States, of whom about 75oooo remained. Thereafter, and until
the 193o's, gross immigration usually exceeded 200,000 per year and on six occasions
Malaya, and Ceylon. Of the approximately 8.5 million Chinese living outside China around 1940, only
300-400 thousand lived, outside of Asia. Of the approximately 3.5 million Japanese living outside
Japan proper in 1940, only about one-fifth were situated outside Asia. Nearly all the Koreans emigrating
from Korea remained in Asia. See J. IsAAc, EcoNomics oF MIoAToN 59-67 (1947); KINGSLEY DAMs,
THE POPULATION OF INDIA AND PAKISTAN C. 13 (95I); United Nations, International Migrations in
the Far East During Recent Times, I POPULATION BULL. 13 (1951), 2 id. at 27 (1952).
'See 2 WALTER F. WILLCOX, INTERNATIONAL MIoRToNs 89 (1931).
A recent estimate suggests

that Willcox underestimated" the ratio of net to gross, and ithat census enumerations somewhat understate
the number of foreign-born. See S. KuzNETs AND F. RUSIN, IMMIGRATION AND THE FOREIGN BORN 14-30,
87-94 (1954). CI. cols. 5 and 6 in Table 1. The fall in the ratio of net to gross immigration is at-

tributed in considerable measure to the fact that the number of departures is a function of an increasingly
large foreign-born population, whereas the number of arrivals is a function of a less rapidly expanding
source of migrants.
" Benjamin Franklin, F. A. Walker, and others have contended. that when immigrants move into an
already occupied country, their coming causes the fertility of the population resident in that country to
fall and stimulates some members of this population to emigrate. These writers have concluded, therefore, that, in the long run, a net influx m of immigrants will increase the population of a given country
of immigration by less than m if it increases that population at all. Some admit, of course, that the
rate at which this population increases will rise at first in consequence of the influx of immigrants, only
to decline subsequently. It is not possible to subject the Walker thesis to careful empirical tests. It
is arguable, however, that an influx of immigrants may increase, decrease, or not affect at all the
longer-run rate of growth of a resident population, with the actual outcome depending on what conditions hold. See TnOMPSON AND WHELPTON, op. cit. supra Table I, at 302-11; also Spengler, On the
Eflects Produced in Immigrant-Receiving Countries by Pre-1939 Immigration, in INTERNATIONAL MIGRATIoN (Brinley Thomas ed. to be published 1956).
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exceeded i,oooooo per year, while the average annual volume of net immigration
ranged between 14o and 620 thousand. In consequence, the foreign-born white
population long increased somewhat more rapidly than the native population, the
ratio of foreign-born to the total population rising from .097 in 185o to a peak of
.145 in 191o. Immigration contributed significantly to American population growth,
net immigration approximating 8 per cent of the total population in 1838-61 and,
thereafter, gradually declining to 2 per cent in i9i8-32.' Net immigration accounted
for about 31 per cent of the increase in population taking place in the period
184o-i9io. By x92o, according to one estimate, of the 94.8 million whites living
in the United States, 53.5 million represented immigrant stock, with immigrants,
children of immigrants, and grandchildren and later generations of immigrants,
respectively, numbering 13.7, 19a, and 2o.6 millions.6 Nonetheless, despite the continuation of a high incremental rate of immigration, the rate of growth of the
American population began to decline after the Civil War; it fell from the level
of 33-36 per cent per decade obtaining in 179o-186o to levels of approximately 26
per cent per decade in 186o-9o, 21 per cent in 1890-i9io, and, thereafter, except for
the depression decade 1930-39, 15 per cent.
The decline in gross immigration which set in after it had reached maximum
levels in 1900-14 was not attributable entirely to a decline in emigration from
Europe. The number of European emigrants declined, it is true, from 11.3 million
in 1901-10 to 7.6 and 6.6 millions in the two decades that followed, and then slumped
to 1.9 million in i93i-4o and some 1.6 million in 1941-5o. This decline, occasioned
initially by World War I, was attributable in part to the introduction of quota and
other restrictions on immigration, to the recurrence of unfavorable business conditions, and to political circumstances which culminated in World War II and the
post-war spread of Communist governments. In the absence of these adverse conditions, emigration from Europe would probably have continued in considerable
volume, despite the decline in the rate of natural increase in northern and western
Europe. For around i93o, there still existed in southern and eastern Europe a "surplus" agricultural population of perhaps 37 million, and around X940, it appeared
likely that the population of these parts of Europe would increase another 26 million
by i97o.7 Even so, the relative number of European emigrants going to the United
States would have declined somewhat, though not nearly so much as it did after
the introduction of restrictive measures in the United States, for the economies of
Canada, Australia, Brazil, and Argentina had developed sufficiently by the late
nineteenth century to attract immigrants in volume. As it was, the percentage immigrants into the United States constituted of all intercontinental migrants declined
from about 70 per cent in i82i-9o, through about 6o per cent in 189o-I91o and 50
r See KuzNErs AND RUBiN, op. cit. supra note 3, at 2, 21-26.
' See Spengler, The Merits and Demerits of the National Origins Provisons for Selecting Immigrants,
10 Sw. PoI.. & Soc. Scr. Q. 155 (1929). See also Tio?PsoN AND WEMLPTON, op. cit. sttpra Table I,
C.3.

'See

,V. E. MOORE, ECONoMfic DEMoGAPHY OF EASTERN AND SoUTERN EuRoP,

56-76 (1945).
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per cent in 1911-3o, to 20 per cent in x931-4o; it may have amounted to as much as
46 per cent in 1941-50. Most of the European immigrants who did not go to the
United States went to British dominions and colonies (principally Australia, New
Zealand, Canada, Africa) or to Latin America (principally Brazil and Argentina).S
In as much as migrants are prompted to move by the prospect of improving their
situations, and since they usually interpret prospects in economic terms, the movement of immigrants into a country is dominated by the conditions surrounding the
demand for labor in that country, while the movement of emigrants out of a country
is usually dominated by the rate at which the labor force is growing, together with
the circumstances governing job opportunities. The conditions surrounding the
demand for labor in the United States were attractive in terms of European standards, it will be indicated later, except in periods of transient unemployment. The
internal conditions by which the disposition of Europeans to emigrate was chiefly
affected were four in number: (i) the movement of relative and absolute natural
increase; (2) the movement of surplus labor out of agricultural areas; (3) the
progress of industrialization and urbanization; and (4) variations in the rate at
which capital was formed in the nonagricultural sector.
(i) Absolute natural increase expanded little in Europe between 182o and 1914,
but it fluctuated considerably, producing fluctuations in the growth of the labor
force fifteen or more years later, and in the volume of emigration about twenty-five

years later. Moreover, after 188o, the rate of natural increase of the agricultural
countries rose relatively to that of the industrial countries, with the result that
population pressure in the agricultural countries came to exceed even more than
formerly that found in the industrial countriesY (2) Throughout the period 1820194 o , an excess of labor was to be found in many rural areas, ready to move in response to the prospect of a slight improvement or under the impact of adversity
(e.g., Irish crop failure; depression of European agricultural prices by agricultural
expansion abroad); it had to find employment in domestic industry or in lands of
immigration. (3) Industrialization and urbanization progressed, spreading eastward and southward, usually very slowly, but sometimes at a rate sufficient to increase employment opportunities for those seeking work in the nonagricultural
sector and to produce changes in the social structure. (4) While capital was increasingly to be had in northern and western Europe, not a great deal was formed
or otherwise obtainable in southern and eastern Europe, even though the absolute
increment in population was growing; whence, additions to the labor force in these
"Se

WOYrTNSKY, op. ct. supra note

2,

at 76-8o.

Quota immigrants from Europe aggregated 624

thousand in 1940-50; all immigrants from Europe numbered 746 thousand in 1941-50. See id. at 8i,
83. For emigrants from Europe, see id. at 75. Cf. S. N. PROKOPOVrCH, L'iNDuSTRIALISATION DES
PAYS AGRICOLES ET LA STRUCTURE DE L'tCONOZME MONDIALE APR S LA GUrERRE 126-39 (1946). Because of the pull of the American economy, Canada lost more migrants to the United States than she
attracted from abroad in r86r-i9oi, but thereafter, usually experienced net immigration. See Nathan
Keyfitz, The Growth of Canadian Population, POPULATION SmoiEs 62 (1950).
' See THOMAS, Op. cit. supra note a, at 8o 58,, 11618, 156-58, 218-19, 313-14; PROKOPOVICH, Op. ct.
supra note 8, at 154-56, 308-09; I. SrENNILSON, GROWTH AND STAGNATION IN TE EUROPEAN ECONOMY C.

4 (1954).
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parts were under pressure to emigrate. With (3)and (4)was associated a diminution in the physical and the monetary costs of imrfiigration.' °
The conditions described varied from country to country. They changed, with
the eastward and southward spread of the forces of economic development, in such
manner that, as the disposition to emigrate diminished in the lands facing the
North Atlantic, it increased in the lands lying to the East and the South. Prior to
185o, northwestern Europe was the source of somewhat more than four-fifths of intercontinental emigration of European origin. As late as 187i-8o, it furnished 65.4 per
cent, and central Europe 23.4 per cent, of this emigration. After 188o, and especially
after i89o, the relative number of emigrants from Latin and East-European countries increased, rising from one-fourth of the total in 188i-9o to about one-half in
i891-193o. The fraction contributed by the British Isles, 76.1 per cent in 1821-40, fell
to 53.2 per cent in i86i-8o, 25.6 per cent in 188I-I92o, and 13 per cent in 1931-38. The
proportion originating in the industrial countries of Europe, comprising nearly all
emigrants before 184o, fell to 8i per cent by i86i-8o, and to about 27 per cent by
i9oi-2o; it rose to 43 per cent in 1921-38 as a result of the establishment of selective
quotas in countries of immigration. These changes are reflected in the fact that by
i93o, only 39 per cent of the foreign-born population was from Germany and northwestern Europe, whereas, in i85o and i89o, the corresponding percentages were
90 and 77. In general, emigrants tended to come from economies, which, being agricultural and relatively unprogressive, could not absorb their growing labor force on
terms comparatively satisfactory to workers, rather than from progressive economies
which were providing improved industrial opportunities for those entering the nonagricultural labor force n
The southward and the eastward shifts of the sources of immigration were accompanied by changes in the composition of the immigrant stream and in the
nature of its impact on the American economy. An increasingly large proportion
of the immigrants came from relatively underdeveloped agricultural countries, with
the result that the occupational composition of the immigrants came to be increasingly inferior to that of an American population which was living in one of the
industrially most progressive parts of the world. Many of the "new" immigrants
from predominantly agricultural southern and eastern Europe were comparatively
illiterate and lacking in occupational and industrial skills. Moreover, many of those
10

See THOmAS, op. cit. stpra note

r,

CC. 3, 10, 12, and 13; D. S. THOMAS, SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC

ASPECTS oF SWEDISH POPULATION MOVEMENTS CC. 2-3 (941); PROXOvOWeC,
Op. cit. supra note 8, c. 4;
D. KIRK, EUaoRP's POPULATnON IN THE INTERWAR YEARS CC. 4-6, 8 (1946); C. CLARK, CONDITIONS OF
ECONOMIC PROCRESS CC.9, II (2d ed. 1951); H. FEls, EuRoPE, THE WoRLD's BANKER, 1870-1914 passim
(1930); SVENNILSON, op. cit. stepra note 9, C. 4.
"' See WOYrlNSKY, op. cit. supra note 2, at 75-76; PRoKopovicu, op. cit. supra note 8, at 126-27.
The increase in the relative number of migrants of Latin origin accounted in part for the increase in

the relative number of European emigrants
Europe rose from I per iooo inhabitants in
higher levels in particular countries, e.g., 8.4
z9o6-ro. Net emigration reached 7 per iooo
1901-05.

who went to Latin America. While emigration from
1846-50 to 2.5 in 19o-o5 and 4.3 in 1913, it attained
in the United Kingdom in 1853-55 and z.6 in Italy in
in Sweden in 1886-9o, 6.3 in Italy and 5.5 in Finland in

See ISAAC, op. cit. supra note 2, at 64-65.
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who possessed craft and occupational skills, finding them not to be ones in great
demand, entered new occupations. It became possible to make effective use of this
vast influx of unskilled workers because, in the late nineteenth century, American
industry became technologically and economically adapted to the utilization of many
workers possessing little or no skill, with the result that craft and handicraft skills
were diluted and reduced in relative significance.12
The absorption of so large and sustained a volume of immigrants into the
American economy was greatly assisted, as was that of domestic population growth,
by the availability of land for settlement and by the high rate at which capital was
formed. Between i85o and 1935, farm land increased from 294 to i,o55 million
acres, and crop land from 113 to 416 million acres, at a rate less rapid than that at
which the number of farms or the total population grew, but more rapid than that
at which the farm population grew. Investment in agricultural plant progressed
about 3 per cent per year in 1870-1920, thereafter to increase only .26 per cent per
year; but yields per acre, after having risen relatively little for three to five decades,
increased sharply after the middle I93o's.' Reproductive tangible wealth grew
much more rapidly than population, with real wealth per head increasing 2.5 per
cent per year in 185o-1900, when population was growing 2.4 per cent per year,
and 1.3 per cent per year in i9oo-i95o, when population was advancing 14 per cent
per year. 4 The rapidity with which real wealth per head grew is attributable to the
high levels of productivity early achieved in American industry,' 5 to the maintenance
of a high rate of capital formation, to the fact that the United States was spared the
cost of producing a considerable fraction of its population, and to the influx of foreign
capital which helped to equip the immigrant population.' 6
The economic absorption, though not necessarily the assimilation, of irmigrants
"E.g., see THoMAS, op. cit. supra note I, at 6o-63, 148-51, 165-74, 268-72; H. D. ANDERSON AND
P. E. DAVbDSON, OCCUPATIONAL TRENDS IN THE UNITED STATES 53-57, 166-67, 572-74 (X940); also
Spengler, supra note 4.
HISsTOUCAL STATISTICS, op. cit. supra Table I, at 29, 95, 121; J. F. DEwHUrsTr, AMERICA'S NEEDS
AND REsoUcRs 793-99 (x955); A. S. TOSTLEBE, THE GROWTH OF PHYSICAL CAPITAL IN AGRICULTURE,
1870-1930 passim' (1954)" See S. KUZNETS AND R. W. GousmiTH, INCOME AND WEALTH OF THE UNITED STATES 269 (1952).
"1 See Rothbarth, Causes of the Superior Efficiency of V.S.A. Industry as Compared With British
Industry, 46 EcoN. J. 383 (1946); Frankel, Anglo-American Productivity Differences: Their Magnitude
and Some Causes, 45 Am. ECoN. REv. 94 (1955).
10 Net capital formation approximated 13 per cent of net national product in 1869-1928, according
to KUZNETS AND GOLDsMITH, op. cit. supra note 14, at X55. Even so, the rate at which capital was
formed was much below the level at which it might have been formed. See F. C. MILLS, PRODUCaIVITy
If, as of I93O, a value of 3-10 thousand dollars is placed on each
AND ECoNo IC PROGRESS 14 (1952).
of the 27.5 million net immigrants into the United States in 1821-i93o, the product, $82-275 billion,
represents a large fraction of the country's accumulated wealth, $362 billion, in 1929. See de Vita, Der
kapitalisierte Wert der r82o-193o in die Vereinigten Staaten von America Eingewanderten, 52 WELTWIRTsCI-ATLICHES ARCHIV 31 (1940); KUZNETS AND GoLDsIITH, op. cit. supra note 14, at 198. Even
if a lower value is set upon each immigrant, on the ground that the alternative use value of the resources incorporated in personal capital would have been less, the capital value of resources saved
would still be large. Between 188o and I91O, net foreign investment exceeded $8oo per foreign worker
added to the labor force. This amount exceeded the value of equipment per worker prior to the early
i9oo's, but was much less than the amount of reproducible capital per member of the labor force. See
id. at 78, 155, 197, 204-05, 300-07, 323.
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was facilitated by the fact that most of them settled in a small number of states
and largely within towns and cities in those states. In 185o, 83.6 per cent of the
foreign-born whites lived in the New England, Middle Atlantic, and East North
Central States; the corresponding percentage was 72.1, 77.3, and 69.7 in i90o, 1930,
and i95o. By i89o, 17 per cent were situated in the West North Central States;
but by i95o, this percentage had declined to 8.3, while that reported for the Pacific
Coast had risen to 1i.6.17 The geographic concentration of immigrant settlement
was accompanied also by industrial concentration, in part because cultural and other
disadvantages under which immigrants often labored reduced their access to some
employments. Among the industries into which they crowded were mining,
quarrying, clothing, textiles, woolen and worsted mills, bakeries, meat packing, car
and railroad shops, silk and carpet mills, brass and rolling mills and blast furnaces,
breweries, tanneries, hat factories, lime, cement, and gypsum factories, marble and
stone yards, rubber factories, piano and organ factories, construction and maintenance."8 Concentration of immigrants in cities where they and their children had
access to educational opportunities facilitated the occupational and industrial progress
of persons of immigrant stock.' 9
II
IMMIGRATION AND THE AMERICAN ECONOMY

Immigration into the United States produced a diversity of effects which, in turn,
modified the magnitude, the structure, and the behavior of the American economy.
Immigration augmented the rate of growth of the net national product, made
possible a better combination of productive agents, and until around the turn of
the century, probably accelerated the rate at which product per capita increased.
Immigration augmented the rate of growth of the net national product, made
scribed in part I, in part because the aboriginal population was sparse, in part because the external economic relations of the American economy were good, and
in part because the American population, though of heterogeneous origin, shared
a developing culture that was suited to give it sufficient socio-economic unity while
reinforcing values conducive to material productivity.
Among the specific effects produced by immigration, the following may be noted:
(I) A disproportionately large fraction of the immigrants were of working age;
thus, whereas, in 187o-1910, immigration increased the population by about 15 per
cent, it swelled the labor force by about 20 per cent.
(2) During the first three-quarters or so of the nineteenth century, many of the
immigrants brought with them scarce but useful occupational skills and superior
17

See

THOMPSON

AND WVHELPTON,

op. cit. supra Table I, at 247;

STATISTICAL

supra Table I.
" See Eckler and Zlotnick, Immigration and the Labor Force, 261
HANDLIN,
BOSTON'S IMMIGRANTS, 1790-1865 passim (941).
9
2 See THOMAS, op. cit. supra note 1, C. 9.

ANNALS

ABSTRACT,

92

(x949);

Op. di.

OSCAR
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industrial methods, together with some relaxation of the customs and horizons by
which their efforts had been bound in the countries of provenience °
(3) The mingling of peoples of diverse cultural backgrounds may have given
rise to cultural as well as to biological heterosis, thereby augmenting productive
power.

21

(4) The manner in which one ethnic group has succeeded another as a dominant
element in the stream of immigration, together with the resulting intensification
of social and economic capillarity (see part III), helped to foster the pursuit of
material success and to generate that spirit of comparatively unrestricted economic
competition which appears to distinguish the American from most other economies.22
(5) Immigration fostered homogeneity of tastes and, therewith, the development
of a large market for the standardized products of highly mechanized industries;
for, no one ethnic group being able to impose its tastes on other groups, each and
all adopted the tastes that they found in America and readily acquiesced in the
changes technologically minded producers found it economical to make in their
2

products

3

(6) The comparative docility of immigrant workers operated, in and after the
last quarter of the nineteenth century, if not earlier, to facilitate the introduction
of efficient, highly mechanized, mass-production methods.
(7) Heavy and continuing immigration of relatively unskilled workers prevented
the real earnings of unskilled labor and of much manufacturing labor of somewhat
more skill from rising significantly, when they rose at all, in the period 189o-1914,
even though output per man-hour was rising perhaps as much as 44 per cent; and
it may account for the fact that real wages rose relatively less in the United States in

2 4
186o-1913 than in the United Kingdom and some West-European countries.
(8) Presumably, immigration, by depressing the ratio of wages received to marginal product, somewhat augmented the "surplus" whence most capital comes.2 5
1°See

R. T. BERTHOFF,

BRITISH IMMIGRANTS

IN INDUSTRIAL

AmERICA

1790-1850

passim (1953);

M. L. HANSEN, THE ImuxGRANT IN AMERICAN HISTORY passim (1940); Herbert Heaton, The Industrial
Immigrant in the United States, 1783-1912, 95 PRoc. Ams. PML. Soc'y 519 (951); CLARK, Op. cit. supra
note to, at 2o6-07, 245. "The immigrants developed the physical riches of America: and, in return,

the new hope, freedom, and changefulness of their lives developed in them germs of high spirit and
initiative," germs latent in most people, but especially in those "who seek new lands." ALFaED
MARSHALL, INDUSTRY AND TRADE 143 (1927)-

2' See Snell, Hybrids and History, The Role of Race and Ethnic Crossing in Individual and National Achievements, 26 Q. REv. BIOL. 331 (1951).
2
The American culture is shot through with ingredients making for productivity. See T. PARSONS,
SOCIAL SYSTEM c. 5 (1951); and cf. MARsHAL, op. Cit. supra note 2o, at 149-50.
" The wide separation of the producer from the consumer, as Marshall observed, also served "to
suppress those methods of production which depend for their strength largely upon the adaptation of
products to the special requirements or tastes of the purchaser." MARSHALL, op. Cit. supra note 2o, at
146-47.
"See

PAUL H.

DOUGLAS,

REAL "VAGES

IN

THE UNITED STArES,

1890-1926

passim

(1930);

W.

MBS, THE WAGES OF UNSKILLED LABOR IN THE MANUFACTURING INDUSTRIES IN THE UNITED STATES,
1890-1924, C. 5 (1926); V. S. THOMPSON, POPULATION: A STUDy IN MALTHUSIANISM 39 et seq. (1915);
KUZNETS AND GoLsmiITrr, op. cit. supra note 14, at 7r; Brown and Hopkins, The Course of Wage-Rates
in Five Countries, z86o-rgr3, 2 OxFOrd Eco. PAPERS 236 (1950).
2 Both gross and net capital formation were higher between 1884 and 1904 than before or after
C

this time.

KUZNETS AND GOLDSMITH, Op. cit.. supra note 14, at 155.
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(9) Immigration certainly affected and may have retarded the progress of trade
unionism in the United States, thereby insuring its own continuation since organized
labor favored the restriction of immigration.2"
(io) The international mobility of population made possible largely by free
migration to America before World War I, together with such economic fluidity as
it produced, helped make workable the system of fixed exchange rates in effect in
many countries before I913 . 7
(iI) As has been noted, the availability of capital was affected by the volume
of immigration. Before 1914, the influx of immigrants, and sometimes the mere
prospect of such an influx, stimulated inflows of capital from Europe, then the
world's banker. Immigrants brought some capital with them and, as remarked
above, by their coming, spared America the cost of producing some 25 million
people. Furthermore, immigration, in so far as it increased the profitability of
American industry, stimulated domestic capital formation. On the whole, therefore,
immigration may be said to have produced side effects which made for capital formation and, thus, counterbalanced much of the increase in capital requirements occasioned by immigration and the disposition of immigrants to make remittances.
It did not, presumably, generate much, if any, inflationary financing of capital
formation, or produce much, if any, unemployment. That immigration did, however, absorb a portion of the annual supply of capital is suggested by the increase
that took place in the supply of American funds available for foreign investment
after quota restrictions had reduced the inflow of immigrants.2 s
(12) Immigration stimulated the growth of net national product per head in at
least two ways in addition to those discussed above. (a) So long as the Atlantic
economy remained subject to increasing return, the movement of people to undersettled parts of this economy, especially to the United States, stimulated the growth
of these parts, and their increased import demands fostered economic development
in the lands of immigrant provenience, with the result that the consequently increased import demands of these countries, in turn, stimulated further growth in
the immigrant-receiving countries? 9 (b) Because of the magnitude of immigration
into the United States before 1914 and its acceleration of the growth of the American
population and its economy, this economy was continually outstripping its stock of
capital, with the result that investment was less risky than in other countries, even
though capital was being formed and introduced at a higher rate than elsewhere.
At the same time, labor (or at least many forms of labor) was usually in short
18

See H. A. MILLIS AND R. E. MONTGOMERY, ORGANIZED LAnOR 14-15, 48-49, 88-90, 124, 154-55

S. PERLMAN, A HistoRy OF TRADE UmONIis
iN TiE UNirED STATES 84 et seq., 179-221 (1923)1
TsHoms, op. cit. supra note i, at 204-05. The role of immigration in a trade union movement depends,
of course, upon the background and industrial and union experience of the immigrant workers. Many
of the immigrants to America had had no such experience. In Australia, by contrast, a powerful trade
(945);

union7 movement was established early.
" See A. P. LERNER, ECONOMICS OF EMPLOYMENT 358 et seq. (1951).
" See THo AS, op. cit. supra note I, at 199-2oi. In the i92o's, capital was formed at a lower
relative rate than earlier. See KUZNETS AND GoLDS1ra'rH, op. cit. supra note X4, at 155.
" See ROYAL ConmasszoN ON PoPuLAroN, Report of the Economics Committee, in 3 PAPERS 5 (950).
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supply. There was no substantial opposition, therefore, to the increasing mechanization of American industry and the continual introduction of ever more effective
labor-saving machinery. Furthermore, because of the high rate at which the stock
of capital was being increased, a considerable fraction of this stock was made up,
at all times, of relatively new and highly productive formsO ° In short, immigration kept the growth process triggered off while it was bringing into being ever
more efficient ways of combining productive agents. It stimulated both capital
formation and technological change, the two forces which have been responsible for
the major part of the increase in output per head experienced in the past i5o years.
Migratory movements are subject to both short-period and long-period fluctuations, which have their origin both in countries of provenience and in countries of
destination; and many of the effects consequent upon immigration reflect these variations. In the past, arrivals, departures, and net arrivals have moved together, but
net arrivals have varied most; for while arrivals fluctuated with business cycles,
departures tended to contract during expansions and to expand during contractions,
perhaps because they were less subject than arrivals to legal controls31 Waves of
arrivals had their origin in the European births cycle and in the impact of innovations in Europe, only to be succeeded by "minor secular upswings in the rate of
economic growth."3 Long "swings in net immigration tended to follow those in
gross national product per worker, and to precede those" in nonfarm residential
construction, which, together with capital expenditures by railroads, made up what
Kuznets calls "population-sensitive" capital. Swings in this sector of capital formation were positively correlated with swings in population growth and negatively
correlated with swings in other sectors of capital formation, probably because
enough savings were not forthcoming in the United States to meet fully the demands for both categories of capitalV3 Thomas found that, as a rule, immigration
preceded building activity in the United States, which was inversely associated with
building activity in Great Britain, the other main member of the Atlantic economy
and a major source of the building-stimulating migrants. He reports also that
whereas in I844-63 immigration preceded the movement of railroad construction,
merchandise imports, and fixed-capital investment, it lagged after rail construction
from 1869 on, and after the output of coal and pig iron from 1899 on. He infers
that immigration was under the dominance of European "push" factors before
i87o, only to pass under that of American "pull" factors, among them, the pace of
investment, after I870."4 While immigration may have prolonged boom periods
by continuing to make labor available on satisfactory terms and may, therefore, have
30 J. M. Keynes and E. A. G. Robinson have drawn attention to the importance of point (b).
op. cit. supra note 14, at 86-88, for evidence of the buoyancy with which
American entrepreneurs assumed risks.
" See KuzNETS AND RuiN€, op. cit. supra note 14, at 36-37.
Cl. KUZNETS AND GOLDOsmnTH,

35THoMAs, op. Cit. supra note I, at 174.

" KUZNE7S AND RuJBiiN, op. cit. supra note 3, at 27-34. The connections between swings in population and capital are treated by Kuznets in a forthcoming study.
"See THOMAS, Op. cit. supra note x, cc. 7, io, and ii.
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intensified the severity of the depressions that followed, it is not evident that the
ratio of years of prosperity to years of depression was significantly affected.V
In the light of what has been said in parts I and II, a strong case can be made
for the proposition that until the close of the nineteenth century and possibly until
the outbreak of World War I, immigration contributed directly and indirectly to the
complex of synergistic forces that were making for the growth of both net national
product and the amount produced per head. It is doubtful, however, whether this
proposition remained valid after World War I. In the two parts that follow, grounds
for this doubt are set forth.
III
SUBSTITUTIVE, COMPLEMENTARY, AND AGGREGATIVE EFFECTS OF IMMIGRATION;
3

SOCIAL CAPILLARITY "

For purposes of analytical and expositive convenience, the economic effects pro-

duced by immigration into a country may be divided into two categories: (a) those
which are substitutive, complementary, or (if there be such) neutral in character;
and (b) those which are describable as aggregative in nature. Effects falling into
category (a) are fairly easy to identify and impute, particularly if it is supposed that
they are either substitutive or complementary. Effects belonging under (b) are not
so easy always to identify, and they usually are very difficult to impute, since
they are also producible by agents other than immigration. We shall note later to
what extent the two kinds of effects may be added algebraically, and in what
measure they may be considered indicative of changes in "economic welfare."
Let us first consider substitutive and complementary effects. Suppose that migrants moving from country A to country B include a relatively large number
of workers who fall into four occupational categories, al, a2, as, and a4, and that
country B has a very low propensity to import and export. In the event that B's
labor force embraces four analogous occupational categories of workers, bi, b2, b3,
and b4, the immigrant workers will be substitutable for native workers in these
categories.

In consequence (abstracting from income or aggregative effects and

proceeding on the assumption that the immigrant workers find employment in their
occupational categories), the relative rates of remuneration received by native workers
in these occupational categories will decline. Simultaneously, the relative rates of
remuneration received by native workers in other occupational categories than
these four will rise, in part because the increase in categories bi-b4, which are
complementary to all or most of categories b5-bn, elevates the schedule of demand
for (and the value productivity of) workers in the latter group of categories. In
general, therefore, the native labor force will at first experience both substitution and
" See H. JEROME, MiGRATIoN AND BUSINESS CYCLES 242 (1926); W. C. MITCHELL, BUSINESS CYCLES
410 (1928).
"In this section, the writer has drawn heavily upon the argument presented in Spengler, supra
note 4.
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complementary effects from the immigrant workers, with the substitution effect being
overriding in proportion as the relative number of workers enrolled in categories
bi-b4 was large already prior to the arrival of the immigrants.
Given (other things being equal) a change in the earnings structure consequent
upon an influx of immigrants, native workers may respond variously. Those enrolled
in occupational categories b1-b4, having had their relative and (perhaps) their absolute earnings reduced by the competition of these immigrants, may remove to less
peopled part of country B, or even emigrate abroad; or they may attempt to enter
occupations b5 -bn, in which event, members of these occupations will experience
substitutive as well as complementary effects; or, if denied these recourses, they may
reduce their net reproduction rate, thereby probably diminishing the potential number of recruits available for occupations bi-b4 fifteen to twenty years later. In each
instance, the savings rates of the affected persons will tend to be reduced. Native
workers in occupations to which the activities of the immigrants are complementary
will undergo a contrary set of reactions. They will be less inclined to migrate or
emigrate, less inclined to change occupation, and disposed to increase both their net
reproduction and their savings rates.
If it be assumed that country B has a high propensity to import and export and
that its economy is open, as was the American in the nineteenth century, the
impact of immigration into B may be largely cushioned. Suppose that individuals engaged in occupations bi-b4 produce largely for export markets, the priceelasticity of demand for B's contribution thereto being very high. Then (assuming
a sufficiency of land and other complementary imputs,) the accession of immigrant
workers in categories al-a4 will not greatly depress the relative levels of earnings
characteristic of occupations bi-b4, since the product of these additional workers can
be sold abroad at but slightly reduced prices. Under these circumstances, much of
the burden of adjustment will fall upon individuals living abroad who are members
of occupations b1-b4 and whose situation may temporarily have been improved
by the removal of the migrants in question. At the same time, the net aggregate
impact experienced by the labor force enrolled in occupations bs-b. will not be great,
since the returns from the sale abroad of the additional exports must, in effect, be
expended abroad. In sum, when (complementary inputs being assumed available)
immigrants enter export industries for whose products price-elasticity of demand is
great, the effect of their coming is relatively widely diffused, the domestic economy is
more easily accommodated to their coming, the wage structure is less affected, and
conditions of full-employment-insuring, balanced growth are more speedily approximated.
Let us now consider the aggregative effect of the influx of immigrants into B.
There will be an increase in the aggregate amount of income produced in B. In
fact, if B is still subject to increasing return, or if the advent of the immigrants
sufficiently stimulates capital formation, the introduction of superior methods, and
technological progress, and produces others of the salutary effects described in the
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preceding part, the income of B will increase in greater proportion than the
population of B has increased as a result of immigration, and income per head will
rise. Under these circumstances, the aggregative effect of immigration would probably swamp its adverse substitution effects after enough time had passed to permit
adjustment. Initially, absolute income per worker would rise in many of the occupations to which the economic activities of the immigrant workers were comple;mentary. This rise would be relatively widespread after the composition of B's
labor force had become sufficiently adjusted to the influx of immigrant workers.
It is not likely, however, that absolute income per worker would rise in occupations
bi-b4 unless the population of B had been subject to increasing return and a sufficient
number of native workers in these occupations had moved into occupations b5-b,.
The relative level of remuneration obtaining in occupations b1 -b4 would remain
lower than it had been prior to the coming of the immigrants, unless a distribution
of workers among occupations substantially similar to that obtaining before the influx
of immigrants had been restored.
So long as a significant amount of immigration continues and the occupational
composition of the immigrant stream differs from that of the native population,
both substitution and complementary effects will be experienced from the foreignborn immigrants. Even if the inflow of immigrants ceases but the occupational
composition of their descendants continues to differ from that of the descendants
of the native population, elements in the latter will experience substitution or
complementary effects of immigrant-stock origin. If, however, immigration ceases,
and, in time, the descendants of the immigrants become distributed in the same
manner as the natives throughout the occupational structure, the natives will no
longer be sensible as formerly of substitution or complementary effects from persons
of immigrant stock. When this has become the situation, therefore, the economic
status of the natives may be said to be better or worse than it would have been in
the absence of immigration accordingly as the amount of equipment and wealth per
head, together with the level of technology and related circumstances, is more or
less advanced than it would have been in the absence of the influx of the immigrants.
The long-run outcome, in short, turns on how powerful the aggregative effect was.
The advent of immigrants is likely to be accompanied, for a time, by an increase in social capillarity. Many, though not all, immigrants into the United
States, particularly after i88o, were under occupational, linguistic, personality, intellectual, and other handicaps, some transient and some not entirely removable.
But these handicaps did not usually persist beyond the second or third generation.
Accordingly, as these handicaps were dissipated, the positions occupied by persons
of immigrant stock underwent change.
Let the occupational structure of a country be represented by four categories,
A, B, C, and D, into which fall io, 20, 3o , and 40 per cent, respectively, of the
gainfully employed. Then, if there arrived io units of immigrants culturally and
otherwise identical with the natives, the io would tend to be distributed among
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categories A-D in the same proportions as the native population, namely, I, 2, 3,
and 4 units, respectively. If, however, the immigrants suffered under handicaps of
the sort described above, more than 4, say 8, of the io units might have to enter
category D, and, say, i each, into categories C and B. Then, one of two outcomes
would be possible. If the underlying determinants of occupational equilibrium were
such as to maintain the proportions which prevailed prior to the arrival of the
immigrants, there would be set in motion an upward movement of the native members of the occupational structure, eventuating, say, as follows: A, ii natives; B,
:21 natives and i immigrant; C, 32 natives and i immigrant; D, 36 natives and 8

immigrants. If, as is probable, equilibrium occupational composition changed, relative expansion would take place in the lower portions of the occupational pyramid,
and there would eventuate a distribution such as the following: A, io natives; B, 20
natives and i immigrant; C, 31 natives and i immigrant; D, 39 natives and 8 immigrants.
The occupational composition of the children of immigrants would approximate
more closely that of the natives than did the occupational composition of the immigrants themselves; and the occupational composition of the grandchildren of the
immigrants would approximate that of the natives even more closely than did the
occupational composition of the children of the immigrants. The rapidity with
which the occupational composition of the immigrant stock approached that of the
natives would depend upon how technologically, and, hence, occupationally, dynamic the country of immigration was, upon the extent and the rigidity of artificial
and institutional barriers which tend to prevent interoccupational movement that
would otherwise take place, and upon the degree to which these barriers impeded
the interoccupational movement of persons of immigrant stock even more than
that of natives. To illustrate: Earlier we put at .4 the probability that a native would
be enrolled in occupational category D and at .8 the corresponding probability for
the immigrant; yet, all or nearly all of the spread between these two probabilities,
being attributable to eliminatable differences between immigrants and natives, would
disappear after one or several generations had passed. Then, the descendants of immigrants of a given period would no longer differ significantly from the descendants
of natives of that same period.
It is said that immigration tends to make a population more fluid or mobile than
it otherwise would be. This result is likely under two conditions: (a) when the
occupational (or other) composition of the immigrants differs from that of the labor
force of the country of immigration, with the result that a series of substitution
effects is generated; and (b) when the coming of the immigrants produces or facilitates fundamental changes in the technological and related determinants of the occupational structure and sets both aggregative and substitutive effects in motion. For
in either instance, the relative amount of movement from some to other occupational
categories would increase and then remain at "abnormally" high levels until the
labor force had become accommodated to the basic occupational structure and a
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model approximating that of Cairnes' and Taussig's relatively noncompeting groups
had come into being. Initially, the upward mobility of the native population would
increase in much greater degree than total mobility of the immigrant population.

But; as the immigrants and their children became assimilated and, hence, freed of
transient disabilities, their upward mobility would increase, and natives who no
longer were capable of competing effectively with the upward-moving immigrant
stock would be displaced downwards. When, however, the initial occupational
composition of the immigrants is quite similar to that of the natives, the coming of
the immigrants produces little change in the relative amount of interoccupational
mobility, since little change is required to permit permanent occupational assimilation
of the immigrants.
Substitution and social capillarity are readily illustrated: (a) It has already been
indicated that relative earnings fell in industries and occupations into which immigrants entered in relatively large numbers. (b) Many immigrants changed their
employments, and younger ones frequently improved their situations markedly"7
(c) After several generations had passed, persons of immigrant stock had virtually
as free access to the upper reaches of the occupational pyramid as had had natives
of some generations standing.38 (d) That immigrants and Negroes frequently are
substitutively related to one another is suggested by the fact that few immigrants
have settled in the South, that the migration of Negroes to industrial states did
not become great until immigration had fallen off, and that interstate migration of
foreign-born was sometimes inversely correlated with that of native whites and
Negroes. As a rule, however, overriding influences which may be looked upon
as aggregative in character have been dominant, with the result that Negroes, foreigners, and native whites have all alike been drawn from their points of origin
to states, cities, and metropolitan centers where industrial opportunities abound
for all.
Aggregative effects are easy to describe and sometimes to identify-a number
of them have been described in part II-but they are seldom easy to assess in
quantitative terms. It is rarely, if ever, possible to separate sharply income increases attributable to an influx of immigrants, particularly when that influx is continuous, from income increases imputable to increases in the stock of capital, to
improvements in technology, or to similar agents. In the preceding part, however,
we inferred that prior to i9oo, and possibly prior to 1914, the aggregative effects of

American immigration were sufficiently powerful to swamp most of its substitutive
and complementary effects, and that, given a virtual discontinuance of immigration
and time for all its effects to work out, the aggregative effects probably would have
"

See Bloch, Occupations of Immigrants Before and Alter Coming to the United States X7 PUIIL'NS

Am. STAT. Ass'N 750 (1920-21); P. E. DAVIDSON AND H. D. ANDERSON, OCCUPATIONAL MOBILITY IN AN
AmERICAN COMMUNITY 117-33, 188 (1937).
8 NATALIE ROGOFF, RECENT TRENDs IN OCCUPATIONAL MOBILITY C. 7 (1953); DAVIDSON AND
ANDERSON, op. dit. supra note 37, at 130-33; THOMAS, OP. cit. supra note x, c. 9.
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swamped the substitution and complementary effects completely. In the next part,
we shall inquire whether this conclusion continues to hold.

IV
IMMIGRATION, POPULATION DENsrrY, CAPITAL REQUIREMENTS

An influx of immigrants makes itself felt aggregatively, both directly and in-

directly. Both sorts of effects were noted in part II. Here, we are concerned with
what usually are the two major effects of immigration: its effect upon capital requirements, and its effect upon division of labor and the ratio of population to
resources.
When a country's population grows, whether from natural increase or from net

immigration, the increment in population must be provided with capital in suitable
forms and amounts; otherwise, living conditions and output per worker or per
capita will fall. The capital required is of three sorts: (a) industrial capital of the
kinds combined with the worker in the employment in which he engages; (b) economic overhead capital, or investment in improvements in transport, building, water
supply, utilities, etc., not allowed for under (a), but still essential to an increase in
the volume of activity; and (c) social overhead capital, or capital utilized in residential, educational, ecclesiastical, governmental, and other facilities not provided for

under (b). It may be possible, when a country is undergoing accelerated development, to skimp on forms of (b) and (c). It is essential, however, that all forms be
allowed for when the longer-run impact of immigration is under consideration.
Of the two modes of estimating aggregate wealth or capital requirements, the
savings-income method is most satisfactory. In a country like the United States,
all wealth together approximates in value to five times the income produced in a
year. Suppose now that population increases I per cent per year. Then, if 5 per
cent of the national income is saved and converted into all the forms of wealth required, the wealth-population ratio will remain constant and, other things being
equal, the level of per capita income will continue substantially unchanged. Five
per cent, therefore, indicates the order of magnitude of the proportion of national
income required to offset a I per cent per year rate of population growth. In as
much as reported wealth-income ratios vary-in part because of differences in the
methods of estimating employed-it may be supposed that the ratio falls within

a range of 4:i to 6:1, and that, therefore, the required saving rate lies between 4 and
6 per cent.
An increase in population of i per cent per year is not obtained without cost,
even though enough saving is done to offset the increase in question. For, the
capital invested in population growth might otherwise have been invested in augmenting the wealth-population ratio and increasing productive power per head.
It is probable that the capital required to support a i per cent per year rate of
population growth might otherwise hfave been utilized to increase per capita income
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between .5 and i per cent per year. If so, the cost of a i per cent per year rate of
population growth is the sacrifice of .5-I per cent per year increase in income per

head. 39
The amount of capital required to equip a given rate of immigration may also
be estimated by adding to the amount required, on an average, to set up an immigrant in a job, allowance for other forms of wealth required to meet the housing
and other needs of himself and his dependents, and applying the resulting sum to
the immigrant stream. This procedure is not very satisfactory, however, since
capital invested per worker varies greatly with industry, and since it is not easy
to arrive at suitable amounts for the other forms of wealth required. The savingsincome method provides the most satisfactory rule of thumb, therefore, for estimating the impact of immigration upon capital requirements and income growth,
even though the composition of the immigrant stream usually differs somewhat
from that of the resident population.
A country may be considered subject to increasing return when an increase in
numbers-that is, in over-all population density-makes possible increase in the
division of labor and the undertaking of methods more efficient that would have
been possible in the absence of this increase in numbers. So long as the condition of
increasing return obtains and increases in population make for increases in per
capita income, a population may be said to be below income-optimum in size.
Whether a population is below income-optimum size, however, depends, in part,
upon the methods of production in use in that population's economy. Thus, the
new methods introduced in the nineteenth century increased the magnitude of the
income-optimum for many countries in which agriculture still predominated
around i8oo. Most students would probably agree, nonetheless, that further technological improvements and related changes would be unlikely to increase the magnitude of the income-optimum further in the United States. Immigration may not,
therefore, be pointed to as a force giving release to increasing return in the United
States, even though it probably would still produce such effect in Canada. Accordingly, an economic case for continued immigration into the United States cannot
be made if maximization of per capita income, or of its rate of growth, is the
objective sought.
The economic case against the continuation of immigration is strengthened when
account is taken of: (a) the fact that the population of the United States is growing
from natural increase at a rate of 1.5 per cent per year or more and is likely to continue growing at this rate for several decades or more; and (b) the fact that many
of the resources of the United States are either relatively fixed or depletable in
quantity. There is not a great deal more land available for putting into continuous
cultivation. The limits of the water supply are being reached in some states. An
increasing amount of minerals must be obtained from foreign sources, many of them
"oThis argument is developed in Spengler, The Population Obstacle to Economic Betterment 4
Eco-,. REv. 343 (1951).
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uncertain or produced under conditions of increasing cost. In short, at the same
time that the American population is growing remarkably, increasing economic

entropy is shrinking the resource base of the American economy and perhaps reducing slightly its income-optimum population magnitude under present technological circumstances.
The burden of the argument presented in this part is that the aggregative effects
of immigration are no longer likely to be sufficiently powerful to accelerate the rate
at which per capita income advances. Accordingly, since the economic case for
continuing immigration rests ultimately upon its aggregative effects, because, in the
longer run, social capillarity dissolves its substitution and its complementary effects,
a case cannot be made unless other sources of aggregative effect described in part II
are more powerful than is commonly supposed.4 °
V
POLICY IMPLICATIONS

It is not our purpose to make policy recommendations, since what is to be recommended turns on what objectives are being sought. Moreover, we are not concerned

with political arguments for immigration, even though they may, at times, be
persuasive. The implications of what has been said for possible courses of action
may, however, be indicated.
(i) Continuation of immigration at a net rate of 250,000 per year-it has been

running somewhat lower-is not likely to affect the progress of per capita income
significantly, provided this rate is not continued indefinitely. This rate-about onetenth of the incremental rate of natural increase-would serve to increase the population only about .15 or less per cent per year. It would not absorb much capital,
and, even though it pressed population beyond the optimum point, it would affect
income much as if returns were constant. It is not likely, of course, that immigration at this rate would long give rise to aggregative effects sufficient to increase per
capita income above the level at which it otherwise would have been. Yet, as is

suggested in (7) below, highly selective immigration can have salutary complementary and aggregative effects.
(2) Immigration at a rate considerably in excess of 250,000 per year would almost
certainly operate to reduce the rate at which per capita income was increasing. This
outcome is made all the more likely by the fact that European countries are not
disposed to have the more skilled members of their labor force depart, and these,
in turn, are less disposed to leave than are those in unskilled and semiskilled categories.
(3) It is not possible to translate substitution, complementary, and aggregative

effects into acceptable and nonarbitrary welfare terms for the economy as a whole.
0 No attempt will be made here to translate economic effects into welfare terms, because of the
difficulties involved. See Spengler, Welfare Economics and the Problem of Overpopulation, 89 SCIENrMA
r28, 166 (954); also H. LEIBENSTEIN, A THEORY OF EcoNomisc-DiMsOORAPHIc DEVELOPMENT C. 9 (1954).
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In the individual case, substitution, complementary, and some aggregative effects can
be assessed and added. But this cannot be done for the population as a whole, in
large part because it is impossible to appraise with precision the aggregative effects
associated with immigration. Furthermore, even if these effects could be expressed
in income terms, they could not be translated into welfare terms unless suitable assumptions were made and accepted. For this reason, it is not easy to formulate an
immigration policy designed to maximize something like welfare per head.
(4) It has been suggested that capital in the United States at present is relatively
more scarce than labor, although this argument has been subjected to criticism. 1
If this argument be valid, then the capital-cost of immigration is greater than has
been assumed.
(5) It is said, by proponents of the view that underemployment equilibrium is
typical of the American economy, that immigration, by increasing the level of investment and, hence, the level of activity in this economy, makes for fuller employment and a higher level of per capita income than would otherwise be attained.
This argument is not acceptable as a basis for policy, however, since a very small
amount of state intervention would produce the same effect, without increasing
population density, and since immigrants are not likely at all times to find ready
access to jobs in the United States.
(6) Because the American trade union movement is so powerful, and because
it exercises so much direct and indirect control over access to job opportunities in
the United States, it is much more difficult for the American economy to absorb
immigrants today than in the pre-1914 era. Because of trade-union influences, immigrants might either be denied access to jobs or be compelled to take jobs at wages
in excess of marginal productivity, with the result that inflation from the cost side
would be stimulated.
(7) If a certain number of immigrants are free to come to the United States and
accept employment where it is offered, their coming will be favorable to all those
who are engaged in complementary activities and to those who employ the services
of immigrant labor, whether as employers or as the purchasers of services. Undoubtedly, there are many instances in which the resident population would experience little or no adverse substitutive effect and marked complementary and aggregative effects from limited and selective immigration. A striking example is labor
which immigrates only seasonally; it benefits everyone and injures no one.
(8) It would be impossible for the United States to afford significant relief to
overpopulated countries situated within or outside Europe. At most, it could accommodate enough immigrants to ease certain disequilibria in European economies.

The number of immigrants the United States can absorb, at no marked cost in terms
"' See Leontief, Domestic Production and Foreign Trade: The American Capital Position Re-examined,
97 PRoc. Am. PmL. Soc'y 332 (1953); Valavanis-Vail, Leontief's Scarce FactorParadox, 62 J. PoL. ECoNi.
523 (1954); Ellsworth, The Structure of American Foreign Trade: A New View Examined, 36 Rtv.
EcoN. & STAT. 279 (1954).
" See Spengler, Population Threatens Prosperity, 34 HARV. Bus. Ruv. 85 (x956).
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of income, is small, far too small to approximate more than i per cent, if that, of the
annual natural increment in the population of the overpopulated countries. Moreover, it would cost far more to establish a given number of immigrants industrially
in the United States than in their countries of origin. Finally, and of paramount
importance, emigration does not tend to bring about natality-reducing changes in the
countries of emigration,43 whereas investment in the industrialization of these countries may produce such effect. In short, a given amount of American investment in
the modernization of the backward economies of overpopulated countries can contribute far more to the eventual relief of population pressure than can a similar
amount of investment devoted to bringing immigrants to the United States from
overpopulated countries and settling them here. There it can transform both the
way of life and the mode of production and thereby bring down natality.
"'Ireland apparently is the only exception.
92,

114-I6 (1936); C. M.

(1940).
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